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Abstract 
How should we conceive of the relationship between European citizenship and national 
citizenship from a normative perspective? While the Treaties assert the supplementary 
nature of European citizenship vis-à-vis national citizenship, advocates of trans- and 
supra-national citizenship perspectives have agreed with the European Court of Justice 
that Union citizenship will ultimately supplant or subsume national citizenship. By 
contrast, we draw upon demoicratic and stakeholder citizenship theories to defend the 
primacy of national over European citizenship. Taking the cases of political and welfare 
rights, we argue that member states may have special duties to second-country nationals 
stemming from a European social contract, but that these duties must be balanced 
against the rights and duties of national citizens stemming from the national social 
contract.  
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Freedom of movement and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality comprise two 
of the most distinctive and controversial upshots of European integration. Both 
elements form central aspects of Union citizenship. Yet, despite citizenship of the 
Union being formally established so as to be ‘additional to and not replace national 
citizenship’ (TFEU Art. 20; TEU Art. 9), these core elements of Union citizenship have 
been regarded as being in tension with national citizenship (Schmidt et al. 2018). 
Indeed, in 2001, the European Court of Justice famously declared in Grzelczyk how 
‘Union Citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the member 
states’ rather than merely supplementing their status as national citizens, a view 
routinely repeated in subsequent rulings involving Union citizenship rights.  
A number of legal and other scholars have explicated and defended the 
teleological logic behind the Court’s reasoning (Benhabib 2002; Kostakopolou 2007). 
They regard the link with national citizenship as a transitional stage. In their view, by 
conferring on resident citizens of another member state equal treatment and rights to 
national citizens, European citizenship relaxes the boundaries of national citizenship 
and opens up the possibility for a new post-national form of citizenship. If transnational 
accounts adopt a flexible and open-ended perspective, in which political communities 
of new kinds are being constructed across as well as above existing state boundaries 
(Bohman 2004; Cohen and Sabel 1997; Kostakopolou 2007: 642-46; Pogge 1992), 
supra-national theorists believe this development points towards some form of 
European federation in which Union citizenship subsumes or supplants national 
citizenship (Habermas 1992; 2000). Yet, precisely these possibilities appear to have 
antagonised many against the EU, with right-wing populists across Europe portraying 
free movement rights as a licence to free ride, depleting the benefits and jobs available 
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to poor and unemployed national citizens, and dismantling the structures capable of 
delivering them in the process (Orr 2017). 
 Our aim is not to evaluate the empirical accuracy of these concerns – we accept 
the dominant view that they have been largely unfounded (see Martinsen and Werner 
2018), at least in the aggregate, even if at the disaggregate level the influx of second 
country nationals may have diminished the availability of certain scarce resources for 
particular localities or groups (European Commission 2014). Our focus lies on whether 
there are independent normative grounds that might justify balancing the rights of 
Union citizenship against duties towards regimes of national citizenship, and even 
regarding the latter as having a degree of primacy over the former. In our view, a 
demoicratic conception of the EU (Nicolaïdis 2013) provides a strong case for holding 
fast to the normative content that we believe animates the Treaty rendering of European 
citizenship as merely complementary to national citizenship. 
The core of our argument is that national demoi continue to be the main source 
of rights for EU citizens. This includes both those who remain in their home state and 
the 2.75% of EU citizens permanently resident in a member state other than their own 
(EC Press Release 2014) who rely on receiving states to secure a large body of rights. 
Not only do these extant circumstances make it normatively justifiable to protect the 
capacity of the member states to deliver public goods to their citizens and residents, we 
claim that these circumstances are themselves desirable. As we go on to explain, the 
diversity of rights offered by the regimes of different states has a value of its own that 
provides strong reasons for resisting certain forms of citizenship standardisation across 
the EU. That is not to deny the normative shortcomings of national citizenship regimes 
within an interconnected world – the one functional and the other moral. We term these 
the sustainability and the justifiability problems. On the one hand, citizens cannot 
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exercise democratic control over the various powers that shape and influence their lives 
within political systems that operate solely within national borders. Domestic decision-
making is increasingly undercut by externally situated agents and agencies. Acting 
alone, states can neither reap the full benefits of any positive externalities resulting from 
their activities nor protect themselves from the negative externalities generated by 
activities outside their territories. On the other hand, the rules of inclusion and exclusion 
can be challenged as giving a morally arbitrary advantage to nationals over non-
nationals that is every bit as objectionable as discrimination on grounds of race or 
gender. We agree these are serious problems and argue that for these very reasons 
national citizenship needs supplementing by something like Union citizenship. So 
supplemented, it becomes possible to have the advantages of national citizenship while 
overcoming many of its disadvantages. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We start by explaining why national citizenship 
should be taken seriously as a domestic social contract between individuals within a 
self-governing political community (section I). We then consider two potential 
solutions to the sustainability and justifiability problems faced by national citizenship 
regimes: transnationalism (Section II) and supranational federalism (Section III). These 
positions are in tension with the domestic social contract in that each seeks in their own 
way to transform national into Union citizenship. Precisely because of this stark tension 
with the domestic social contract, which we believe does and should serve as the main 
locus of citizens’ rights, we reject these positions. In their place, we sketch a version of 
the demoicratic social contract that confronts the strengths and weaknesses of national 
and Union citizenship by explicitly combining the dual status of Europeans as national 
and Union citizens, and the complementary roles that they play (Section IV). From this 
perspective, the possibility of the arbitrary exclusion of non-national citizens from the 
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domestic social contract has to be balanced against the equally important possibility of 
the arbitrary inclusion of non-citizens. Finally, we explore how this perspective 
justifies certain national limits on the citizenship claims of European citizens when such 
individuals take up the role of second-country national through the exercise of their free 
movement rights (Section V). Recruiting Rainer Bauböck’s (2015) stakeholder 
approach to our demoicratic reasoning, we believe normatively valid grounds exist for 
many of the political and welfare citizenship exclusions for second-country nationals 
currently practiced in the EU.  
 
The domestic social contract: national citizenship as the ‘right to have rights’ 
National citizenship is intrinsic to a number of valuable democratic practices, and a 
failure to acknowledge its beneficial qualities as well as its many drawbacks risks 
throwing the baby out with the bath water. For all their faults, democratic nation states, 
such as the member states of the EU, provide the most effective political systems so far 
devised for rendering governments accountable to the governed in ways that encourage 
these same governments to pursue policies aimed at treating the governed with equal 
concern and respect, and thereby securing their rights (Christiano 2011).  
National citizenship plays an important role in the functioning and stability of 
such an arrangement. On the one hand, the citizens of a national political community 
are co-participants in a scheme of social and economic cooperation capable of 
supporting expenditure on a suitable public infrastructure needed to secure rights. 
Moreover, involvement in such a scheme fosters a degree of trust and solidarity 
necessary to commit to a common scheme of welfare to guard against social risks. On 
the other hand, citizens are co-participants in a scheme of political cooperation through 
which individual rights can be claimed, justified and agreed to on equal terms to others. 
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Taken together, these two schemes constitute a modern version of the social contract 
that a long tradition of political thought has envisaged as a model of the relations 
binding citizens both to each other and to a given political community  
Involvement in both schemes renders citizenship the ‘right to have rights’ 
(Arendt 1958: 296). This context enables rights to be effectively and legitimately 
claimed (Bellamy 2012a), in ways that allows a system of rights that is sustainable and 
fair to emerge (Rawls 1999: 63). For involvement in these two schemes generates not 
only rights but also reciprocal duties. These duties are for the most part prosaic, 
consisting of paying taxes, voting, respect for the rule of law and civility towards others. 
As we shall note in the penultimate section, political rights, on the one side, and social 
rights, on the other, can be related respectively to being a ‘stakeholder’ in the political 
and social schemes of social co-operation outlined above. That is, they arise from being 
a party to the domestic social contract at the level of the nation state. 
To an important degree, the link between national citizenship and the domestic 
social contract is recognised in the current supplementary role played by Union 
citizenship and the limits that are placed upon it. Union citizenship rights are not 
absolute, but ‘shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined 
in the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder’ (Article 20 (2) TFEU). Most 
of these limiting conditions relate to protecting the integrity of national political and 
welfare systems and involve distinguishing the rights of national from Union citizens. 
For example, they include derogations to the right to move and reside on the basis of 
‘public policy, public security or public health’ (Articles 45 and 52 TFEU, and see C-
64/96, Uecker 1997), and make the right of residence for periods of longer than 3 
months dependent on having employment in the host member state or ‘sufficient 
resources for themselves and their family members not to become a burden on the social 
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assistance system’ or possessing ‘comprehensive sickness insurance cover’ (Article 7 
Directive 2004/38), with that right being retained only ‘as long as they do not become 
an unreasonable burden’ (Article 14 (1) Directive 2004/38).  
Although the Court has tended hitherto to read these conditions and limits 
somewhat narrowly, it has always taken them into account (Davies 2018). The Case of 
Dano (C-333/13), where the ECJ ruled that second-country nationals who are not 
working or pursuing work in their country of residence may be excluded from non-
contributory social benefits, reveals that these are not negligible constraints. 
Nonetheless, many commentators view such constraints as at odds with the inner logic 
of Union citizenship and have sharply criticised moves to reassert them as ‘reactionary’ 
(Spaventa 2017; O’Brien 2017). 
 
The transnational social contract: citizenship as free movement 
Advocates of the transnational account of Union citizenship imply the existence of a 
global social contract between individuals that in many ways mirrors the kind of social 
contract typically applied to the nation-state context (Pogge 1992).1 Proponents of this 
view believe that the sustainability problem facing nation-states has set in motion global 
processes of interconnectedness that makes any partiality towards national citizens hard 
to justify. They point to the development of international human rights norms and 
political arrangements beyond the state as suggesting significant if tentative moves 
towards a more trans- and post- national world order, placing the national social 
contract and the global social contract in tension.  
Transnationalism is an essentially horizontal view that emphasises relationships 
between individuals and their organisations that transcend vertical relationships 
between governments and individuals at either the national or supranational level.2 On 
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this view, restrictions of free movement and other protectionist regulations that stymie 
the development of transnational networks (which may rely upon and seek to promote 
the flow of goods, information, people, etc.) are inconsistent with the idea of individuals 
as subjects of equal moral worth. In this sense, while vertical EU institutions may be 
welcomed as lubricating the conditions for cooperation between individuals and their 
organisations beyond the state, the limitations that the EU places on interactions with 
third countries is also an obstacle to developing a more cosmopolitan transnationalism.  
Operating within the confines of the EU vertical structure, the transnational 
perspective maintains that EU citizens’ rights should not be affected by or secondary 
to national citizenship. Rather, they should attach to all individuals who may claim 
them simply through exercising a basic right to move and live with others and 
participate in supporting and re-constructing the community to which they have 
associated themselves (Kochenov 2014). As a result, we have a moral obligation to 
uphold not only the basic human rights of all individuals, but also to treat them with 
equal concern and respect to our compatriots. Indeed, European law has established, 
and the Court of Justice progressively extended, a wide range of substantive benefits 
that Union citizens and their family members can enjoy in a host member state by 
prohibiting discrimination ‘as regards access to employment, remuneration and other 
conditions of work, and the enjoyment of social and tax advantages, housing, equal 
access to vocational schools and retraining centres and participation in trade unions and 
staff associations.’ (Kostakopolou 2007: 640). Meanwhile, the rights to vote in local 
and European elections wherever a Union citizen is domiciled are seen as naturally 
leading to the right to vote in the national elections of the host state (Kostakopolou 
2007: 644-46).  
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The transnational perspective seeks to uncouple the rights of individuals to 
pursue their personal goals and interests on an equal basis to others either from 
economic participation within and a contribution to, or membership of and 
identification with, the polity in which one resides (Scharpf 2009: 191-198). 
Consequently, many citizenship rights, including access to important social and 
economic benefits, get disassociated not just from political citizenship, but also from 
the standard prerequisites for obtaining the same: namely, an economic stake in the 
fortunes of the state, membership and a degree of identification with it, and political 
participation in shaping and sustaining the goods that it provides its citizens. This 
process has produced what Seyla Benhabib calls the disaggregation of citizenship 
(Benhabib 2008: 46-47), whereby the synthesis of civic with civil and commercial 
liberties achieved within the nation state has been pulled apart as the second and third 
have become detached from the first. Instead, modern civil and commercial liberties 
have become the trigger of themselves for access to certain civic liberties: notably, the 
ability to vote and stand in local and European elections when residing in another 
member state, and admission to social benefits that hitherto have been both privileges 
of political citizenship and part of their foundation (Bellamy 2012b). While she 
welcomes this development, we regard it as potentially unravelling the domestic social 
contract that generates these rights in the first place. 
In this regard, we prove critical of ECJ case law that significantly advances the 
transnational and supranational commitment to a nationally insensitive citizenship 
regime for the EU. These transformative views are overly sanguine about how the 
judicialisation of the EU’s transnational citizenship provisions by the ECJ has largely 
occurred as an extension of the lex mercatoria of the single market (e.g. Benhabib 2008: 
46-7). In a series of judgments, the European Court of Justice has argued that Union 
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citizenship offers a Treaty based, directly effective right of its own, which undercuts 
many of the limitations member states sought to expressly build into the relevant 
directives (notably Directive 2004/38/EC). These decisions have fleshed out a form of 
market citizenship at the EU level that potentially conflicts with political and social 
citizenship at the member state level (Everson 1995).  
For example, the Court has argued that the restrictions protecting national 
citizenship have to be applied in a ‘proportional’ manner (C-413/99, Baumbast 2002) 
that do not deprive Union citizens of a right to move and reside that exists independently 
of their pursuit of any economic activity (C-200/02, Chen 2004), thereby creating new 
rights for non-workers (C-85/96, Sala 1998; C-456/02, Trojani 2004), students (C-
184/99, Grzelczyk 2001), and job-seekers (C-138/02, Collins 2004), weakening public 
interest derogations that excluded non-nationals from certain public service jobs (C-
405/01, Marina Mercante Espanola 2003), and altering what could be considered a 
‘wholly internal’ matter for member states (C-148/02, Avello 2003; Chen 2004; C-
135/08, Rottmann 2010; C-34/09, Zambrano 2011, although see C-434/09, McCarthy 
2011 which arguably reasserts the internal rule).  
In a parallel move, Grzelczyk (2001) held that ‘a certain degree of financial 
solidarity’ now existed between the member states. Yet, though responses to the euro 
crisis suggest such solidarity is decidedly limited, the Court has consistently refused to 
treat national fiscal concerns as posing restrictions on the exercise of European liberties. 
Moreover, there have been a series of judgments that have prioritised EU level 
economic freedoms over member state level social rights (C-438/05, Viking 2008; C-
341/05, Laval 2008; C-346/06, Rüffert 2008 and C-319/06, Luxembourg 2008). In these 
cases, the Court has attempted to impose a uniform, minimum standard of wage 
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legislation that overrides local collective bargaining agreements, thereby hindering the 
exercise of Union rights. 
True, the legal framework constructed by the Court allows those Union citizens 
excluded from national political processes to claim certain rights. However, 
commentators who see this possibility as an equivalent and necessary supplement to 
democratic participation go too far (De Burca 1995). It shows how the terminology of 
citizenship rights provides the deployment of litigation by market actors with a false 
legitimacy. For it allows those actors with an economic interest in further market 
integration - the majority of which are enterprises rather than individuals - a privileged 
venue that is biased against, and often inaccessible by, the immobile majority, 
undermining the relative political equality offered by democratic citizenship (Isiksel 
2016: 142-3).  
 
The supra-national social contract: federal citizenship 
Supranational theorists also seek to secure the same equality of treatment for 
individuals and their organisations across states. However, they attempt to overcome 
some of the difficulties we have identified with transnational perspectives by embracing 
the need for vertical governance structures that establish transnational political 
communities (Habermas 2000). The EU is held up as a major step in this regard. On 
the one hand, it offers a prospective basis for the development of a post-national 
political community based on universalisable constitutional principles that overcome 
the shortcomings of the narrow forms of inclusion associated with nation-states (Müller 
2008). On the other hand, the creation of an accountable power centre ensures that 
citizens may retain democratic control over the process of transnationalisation in a way 
that may not be possible on the transnational view. While the supranational account 
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does not collapse into an endorsement of a centralised superstate, it sees supranational 
institutions as the valid locus of power for those competences that ensure the equal 
treatment of national and non-national citizens.  
However, there are reasons to be at least partly sceptical of supranationalism’s 
identity and competence theses. Although there is evidence of an emergent European 
identity, it is doubtful that this would one day replace national identity, while any such 
post-national identity may in and of itself be undesirable. On the one hand, it is unlikely 
that the conditions that brought about the nation-state and established bonds of 
solidarity among citizens could be replicated at the supranational level. On the other 
hand, the common history, culture and language that have facilitated the development 
of nation-states should not be dismissed as simply romantic attachments since they also 
facilitate the operation of democracy as a mechanism for the public realization of the 
equal status of citizens. A common language, for example, is not just a marker of 
identity but also a means of communication that develops in a localised vernacular and 
can make politics understandable to all within a culturally idiosyncratic polity 
(Kymlicka 2001).  
A similar caution is warranted with regard to the claim that supranational 
authority should be endowed with those competences required to ensure the equal 
treatment of all citizens. The evolution of competences to the supranational level 
generally comes with a trade-off in the ability of member states to pursue goods in 
accord with their own political culture and constitutional traditions. There is inherent 
value to this freedom as a condition of democratic self-determination, while the 
diversity of legal regimes resulting from the pursuit of different projects of self-
government among states maintains the right to exit as a meaningful possibility for 
citizens within the EU. Although there may be good reasons to level up certain 
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competences to the supranational level, such levelling up should not be assumed to be 
morally required to ensure the equal treatment of citizens across the Union. On each 
occasion, the case for upward competence transfer must include a balancing of the 
interest of states and the preservation of their citizenship regimes.  
National citizenship needs to be both sustainable and justifiable. Contrary to 
transnational and supranational approaches, we believe that is best achieved through 
supplementing national with Union citizenship in ways that balance their respective 
advantages and disadvantages. Such a balance implies a demoicratic framework based 
on a social contract between both the member states of the Union and their various 
individual citizens. We turn next to the nature of such a demoicratic citizenship before 
exploring the character of the balance it instantiates. 
 
The demoicratic social contract 
While advocates of trans- and supra- national citizenship are right to be concerned 
about the possibility of domination of one group of national citizens by another group, 
and of arbitrary exclusions of individuals from national citizenship regimes, we have 
also seen that advocates of national citizenship have a parallel concern with the 
arbitrary inclusion of non-citizens within the benefits of national citizenship. 
Membership of the EU may offer a way for democratic states to address the 
sustainability problem by agreeing on ways to regulate both their interactions and 
global processes that transcend them that are in their mutual interest. However, 
envisaging an EU where states as the representatives of their national citizens are the 
only relevant normative subject is bound to produce a system of arbitrary exclusions 
from the perspective of individuals, thereby raising the justification problem. However, 
conceiving of an EU where the only relevant normative subjects are Union citizens - 
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regardless of their citizenship of a given member state - will inevitably produce 
arbitrary inclusions from the perspective of the national citizenship regimes of states. 
It is for this reason that, following Cheneval and Schimmelfennig (2013), we interpret 
the demoicratic social contract as recognising states as the representatives of national 
citizens, on the one side, and Union citizens, on the other side, whose interests the 
Union must seek to balance.3 
In the social contract tradition, a fair society is possible only if all those party to 
the contract are recognised as autonomous in formulating the agreement and cannot be 
expected to give up their autonomy in the creation of a new political community. 
Following this tradition, the demoicratic social contract seeks to ensure that the 
autonomy of both national citizens within states and Union citizens regardless of their 
state are preserved in the resulting agreement. In practice, this entails that states cannot 
be expected to rescind their sovereignty and that of national citizens in favour of 
empowering a supranational citizenry, any more than Union citizens would fail to 
ensure that there are institutional provisions under the agreement to secure their 
individual capacities to pursue an autonomous plan of life throughout the supranational 
political union.  
 Although there is not full agreement among those who employ the demoicratic 
approach on what principles necessarily follow from this agreement between national 
and Union citizens, there is broad consensus on a number of important points, such as 
the right of states to unilaterally withdraw from the Union and to confer competences 
upon it by mutual agreement (see Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013; Bellamy 2013; 
Nicolaïdis 2013; Lacey 2017). A defence of Union citizenship as derivative from 
national citizenship, involving trans- and supra-national rights that supplement but do 
not replace or curtail those at the national level, has not been fully articulated by those 
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developing the normative foundations of demoicracy.4 However, we believe that this 
position naturally emerges from any demoicratic account.  
To proclaim European citizenship as equal to, or taking primacy over, national 
citizenship could have far-reaching consequences with the potential to undermine the 
autonomy of states that provide the locus of national citizenship. More important, such 
a provision would be in direct tension with the right of the national citizens of a member 
state to withdraw from the Union and to choose which competences they confer upon 
it. On the one hand, if individuals are European first, then how could they be ever 
legitimately deprived of this citizenship by a state that decides to exit the Union? On 
the other hand, the primacy of European citizenship implies the entitlement of European 
citizens to automatically claim the same entitlements as national citizens wherever they 
decide to reside within the Union. On the demoicratic approach, the principle of non-
discrimination does not mean that Union citizens should be guaranteed the same 
entitlements as national citizens across the polity, but merely that they should be 
guaranteed a circumscribed set of rights and duties that fall within the rubric of 
European citizenship conceived as supplementary to national citizenship.  
In the demoicratic social contract, it is assumed that all member states are social 
liberal democracies, with social liberal democratic institutions providing the legal and 
political freedoms and social and economic protections necessary for national citizens 
to pursue an autonomous life. Neither the national citizens of democratic states nor the 
prospective citizens of the union would agree to a political union with other states that 
are unable to provide these conditions of autonomy for their citizens, either prior to 
founding the political union or as a likely result of entering into a mutually beneficial 
common market together. The reason is that such a union would not ultimately expand 
the space wherein national citizens qua union citizens may pursue an autonomous plan 
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of life across the political union. That is to say, if a member state did not at least 
demonstrate the potential to provide adequate freedoms and protections for its own 
citizens, there is little chance that it could contribute to a free movement regime where 
second-country nationals could pursue an autonomous plan of life within its territory.  
Applying this view to the EU, there is a priority given to member states in 
providing the legal and political and socioeconomic bases of autonomy for their own 
citizens and a presumption that other citizens of the Union should ultimately have 
access to that scheme of cooperation. As we have suggested, however, full access to 
the scheme of goods provided by national citizenship is not necessarily an automatic 
entitlement. Nor is it duty-free. As we explain below, of the three main available 
answers to the question of when second-country EU nationals should be entitled to the 
national citizenship benefits of a receiving state, only one follows naturally from a 
demoicratic perspective: stakeholder citizenship.  
 
Non-arbitrary inclusion in national citizenship regimes  
In political theory, the question of inclusion has been primarily addressed with regard 
to the rightful use of coercive power. In other words, the key question has been who 
should be entitled to a say in the decision-making process of a coercive authority? The 
related yet distinct question of when non-citizens should be entitled to the welfare rights 
provided by a state is rarely addressed. In what follows, we explain why certain 
exclusions of European citizens from certain political and social rights of national 
citizenship are normatively justified. We relate these exclusions to the importance of 
being a stakeholder in the domestic social contract. However, we note that all the 
national citizens of different member states are also stakeholders in the demoicratic 
social contract and by virtue of this complementary membership are entitled to certain 
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rights of inclusion that modify these exclusions, overcoming both the sustainability and 
the justifiability problems of national citizenship in the process. 
 
The case of political rights 
The two most prevalent views on granting political rights to non-citizens are the all-
affected interests principle and the all-subjected to coercion principle. A problem with 
these principles is that they are so concerned with ensuring that illegitimate exclusions 
are eliminated that they fail to recognise the problems posed by illegitimate inclusions. 
As Bauböck (2015) observes, both principles are oriented towards output legitimacy in 
recommending that the political membership boundaries of existing demoi be redrawn 
on the basis of how individuals are affected or their subjection to a coercive authority. 
Moreover, both prove too encompassing in scope. According to the all-affected 
interests principle, in a globally interconnected world, the demos would need to be 
radically redefined on a potentially worldwide scale to ensure that all those who are 
affected by the decisions of other territories are included with citizens of those 
territories equally in the decision-making process (Goodin 2008). The all-subjected to 
coercion principle appears narrower, arguing that the morally relevant feature for 
inclusion in democratic processes is being coercively subject to obey their decisions 
(Abizadeh 2012). Yet, this view suggests that anyone on the territory of a coercive 
authority, including transients like tourists and short-term residents, are entitled to the 
same political rights as citizens of the polity in question.  
By contrast, Bauböck’s ‘stakeholder’ conception of citizenship offers an input 
account of democratic inclusion. Bauböck contends that the input question, determining 
who is entitled to authorise a government in making decisions, is logically prior to the 
question of the material or coercive effects these decisions may have on particular 
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individuals. On the stakeholder account (Bauböck 2015), the claim to being a citizen of 
a given sovereign political community belongs to those whose freedom and rights are 
inherently linked to the collective self-government and flourishing of this polity over 
time. Such individuals must be credibly pursuing a plan of life over time within the 
society in question. For those capable, this includes contributing to the production of 
collective goods through working and the performance of the civic and social duties 
required to sustain the domestic social contract: from paying taxes to good 
neighbourliness. Long term residents generally make such contributions and perform 
such duties, which should be recognised by allowing them easy access to citizenship as 
a way of committing long term to their host state. 
We endorse this stakeholder account as part of a demoicratic understanding of 
European citizenship. It provides a robust rationale for the legitimacy of the demoi as 
autonomous subjects with the right to develop their own national citizenship regime. 
On this view, Union citizenship legitimately grants rights to vote in local and EP 
elections anywhere within the EU based on residence alone. If a Union citizen moves 
to another state long enough to register as a resident, they will be participating in the 
local community sufficiently to be considered a local stakeholder. Of course, they may 
not intend to stay long-term, but that will be the same for many national citizens who 
move around their own country. Regardless of where they reside in the EU, Union 
citizens have an equal interest in influencing how the EU operates. That is to say, by 
moving from one country to another within the territory of the EU, citizens are still 
participating within the EU political community and thereby maintain an equal stake in 
determining how it is governed from within the national context in which they find 
themselves.  
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However, national policy-making holds a special place in the process of self-
government. It is the arena that not only passes general laws for the entire polity, 
including providing the framework within which local government operates, but also 
defines national policy in international and especially EU affairs. As a result, voting in 
national elections gives individuals an influence over the direction of the internal and 
external affairs of the entire polity, and so should be limited to those most likely to use 
their political rights to advance the long-term interests of the community. Therefore, to 
qualify for a vote in national elections in another member state to their own, it is 
justifiable that a Union citizen should have to demonstrate that their plan of life is bound 
up with the prosperity of the host state both through their long-term residency in that 
state and by undertaking the necessary measures to become full citizens. The obligation 
of the host state in this regard consists merely in not making their acquisition of 
citizenship overly complicated for those who have met a reasonable, but not excessively 
long, residency requirement, which within the EU is standardly five years (Bauböck 
2012: 3). Individuals residing abroad, however, ought not to be denied the right to vote 
in their home state’s national elections for at least a certain period, whether by returning 
home or by postal vote. This common practice is justified by the fact that citizens of a 
given state may be abroad only for a limited time, intending to return in due course and 
thereby continuing to have their plan of life significantly invested in that state. In the 
EU context, though, allowing individuals to vote in multiple national elections is 
difficult to justify on grounds of political equality as it gives some EU citizens a double 
say in how member states influence EU policy. By naturalising and maintaining 
residence in their adopted state, individuals should be precluded from voting in their 
member state of origin, even if they choose to possess dual citizenship. 
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None of this is to say that non-citizen residents are morally entitled to little more 
than participation in local and EP elections. As Bauböck (2015) explains, the all-
affected interests and all-subjected to coercion principles do point to valid moral 
concerns. While the fact of being affected by a political decision does not ground a right 
to equal inclusion in the decision-making process, it does ground a moral right to a fair 
hearing and due consideration by those authorised to make the decision by their citizen 
stakeholders. Similarly, although being coerced by a political authority does not give 
one the right to a say in the political process, it does ground moral rights to the 
contestation of decisions. On this interpretation of the principles, the interests of all 
non-citizen residents have a right to be considered by the national authorities in the 
decisions that will affect this constituency, while they should maintain equal access 
with national citizens to courts and to participate in all legal forms of political 
organisation. 
 
The case of welfare rights 
The question of welfare rights in the EU plays out in a similar way. Two relatively 
expansive views also frame this debate - what we shall call the equal citizenship 
principle and the equal residency principle.  
From a trans- or supra- national perspective, citizens in a political union require 
the same set of basic goods to pursue an autonomous life and so should be automatically 
entitled to claim the social welfare required to meet these conditions of autonomy, 
wherever they reside. As Habermas (2012: 53) argues, that suggests ‘the Union must 
guarantee what the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic calls the “uniformity of 
living standards” (Art. 106, para 3).’ From a demoicratic perspective, Europe-wide 
civic solidarity needs to be balanced against the diversity and sustainability of national 
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social welfare systems. As we remarked above, there are substantial costs to a 
significant supranational move in this direction that include undermining the flexibility 
of states to adjust welfare regimes according to their own democratic preferences and 
socioeconomic circumstances. The example of German medical students in Austria is 
a case in point (Schenk and Schmidt 2018). 
The equal residency approach affirms the value of maintaining social welfare at 
the national level, but nevertheless follows the equal citizenship principle in 
recognising that non-citizen residents without gainful employment or other financial 
support will require access to the same social welfare services as citizen residents if 
they are to pursue an autonomous life in the receiving state.5 Such a view, however, 
fails to explain why the rights of national citizens to welfare are based on their 
stakeholdership in the political community, whereas new residents who have never 
made or do not intend to make such contributions should be automatically entitled to 
the same provisions. Indeed, it is precisely concerns of this kind that were at stake in 
the Dano case described earlier. 
Once again, adopting a stakeholder conception of demoicratic citizenship 
provides a more satisfactory criterion for welfare inclusion. We have seen that if a 
resident non-citizen is to demonstrate themselves as a full stakeholder in a receiving 
state, and thereby become entitled to full citizenship, it will often take a period of 
several years. An equivalent period of time before being granted access to the same 
welfare provisions as national citizens would be undoubtedly too demanding. For 
example, should a non-citizen resident work for several years before being finally made 
redundant, precluding them from jobseekers allowance or other social benefits would 
unfairly negate the contributions to society they have made and that they are willing to 
continue to make if provided with the opportunity to do so.  
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For this reason, we suggest that so long as a resident non-citizen has a 
perspective on stakeholdership, they are entitled to the same social welfare scheme as 
established stakeholders. Having a perspective on stakeholdership does not mean that 
one will ultimately become a stakeholder, or is committed to long-term residency in the 
state in question, but that one has demonstrated a willingness and capacity to contribute 
to the socioeconomic fabric of the receiving state. Although individuals may so 
contribute in a number of ways, such as consumption, paying property taxes and the 
like, the vast majority of individuals require gainful employment to have the resources 
to make these and similar contributions. As a result, the ability of non-citizen residents 
to maintain a relatively consistent employment status over a certain period will 
frequently be the best means of determining whether they have adopted an appropriate 
perspective on stakeholdership or not.  
What it costs to run the social welfare regime in question would seem to be the 
most relevant, and non-arbitrary, metric for determining what should be the length of 
this minimum period – regardless of the mix of contributory or universal elements in 
the system concerned. That is to say, since different member states will have more or 
less generous welfare regimes that are more or less expensive to run, member states 
should have a significant degree of flexibility in determining how deep a non-citizen 
residents’ perspective on stakeholdership must be if they are to be granted equivalent 
access to social welfare provisions as citizens. To ensure that member states do not 
impose excessive and unjustifiable limits on access to social services, the principles 
limiting flexibility in this matter should be agreed by them at the European level and 
enforced by the ECJ. However, they may be justified in not making this period too 
short. It can take some time for a second country national to make significant 
socioeconomic contributions, and thereby offset his potential burden on the state in the 
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event of unemployment, and to demonstrate their willingness and ability to be 
consistent and active contributors to the labour force.  
In committing to the stakeholder view on welfare rights, we do not discount the 
validity of the moral concerns for citizens’ autonomy raised by the equal citizenship 
and equal residency principles. While a concern for the autonomy of citizens in other 
member states does not ground a moral claim for welfare standardization across the 
EU, it places a moral onus on member states with greater capacity to facilitate the 
socioeconomic development of less fortunate states so that they may eventually provide 
the conditions of autonomy for their citizens and second country nationals. 
Furthermore, although a concern for the autonomy of non-citizen residents does not 
ground a moral claim to receive the same welfare benefits as stakeholders without 
having first contributed significantly to the welfare regime, it may ground a moral claim 
to provide a degree of temporary assistance to non-citizen residents to alleviate some 
of the harshest consequences of arriving in a new state without employment. Should a 
second-country national fail to find employment within a relatively short-period, it may 
be justifiable to halt this assistance. 
One way in which a) wealthier states could meet some of their duties to citizens 
in less fortunate states and b) states generally could meet some of their duties to non-
citizen residents seeking work within their territory is to provide a European Social 
Minimum (Viehoff 2017) or Euro-dividend (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017: 235-
42), that is, an unconditional and universal basic income for all European citizens that 
is assigned relative to the cost of living within states. While wealthier states would be, 
at least initially, net contributors to this scheme, such a basic income would have the 
advantage of reducing the likelihood of some negative behaviour that a free movement 
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regime might engender. For example, it would make ‘social dumping’ less attractive to 
workers and ‘benefit tourism’ less appealing to potential claimants.  
At the beginning of this sub-section, we noted what could be lost if states 
centralised welfare competences at the EU level. The proposal for a basic income is far 
less demanding than the transfer of competences required by the equal citizenship 
principle. Being set at a relatively low level, while claiming no other competences for 
welfare programmes supranationally, a European basic income would only modestly 
interfere with the national administration of welfare regimes, providing each state with 
a wide scope for adjusting its welfare policies.  
 
Conclusion 
We have attempted to build a normative case for justifying the complementary status 
of European citizenship to national citizenship. On the one hand, we have defended the 
importance of states as cooperative schemes of self-government for their citizens. On 
the other hand, we outlined the shortcomings of an international order based exclusively 
on national citizenships, which reduces the capacity of states to fulfil their duties to 
non-citizens. We proposed the concept of demoicracy as a normative account that 
justifies the primacy of national over European citizenship and can balance the two in 
a way that guards against both under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness. Finally, we 
drew on Bauböck’s stakeholder conception of citizenship to demonstrate how the 
demoicratic account balances the rights of national and Union citizens when it comes 
to granting political rights and welfare rights to non-citizens.  
While we argued that non-citizen residents should be entitled to full citizenship 
and a vote in national elections only after they had established themselves as 
stakeholders in the political community, we defended their entitlement to a) vote in 
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local and EP elections, b) due consideration by the authorities in making national 
legislation, c) contest political decisions and d) vote in the national elections of their 
country of origin. With regard to welfare rights, we explained that non-citizen residents 
should only be entitled to equal welfare rights to existing citizen stakeholders when 
they take on a ‘perspective to stakeholdership’, not least by contributing to the tax base 
of the political community over a reasonable period of time,. This restriction does not 
discount the limited duties wealthier states have to citizens of less fortunate states, as 
well as to unemployed non-citizen residents who have not attained a perspective on 
stakeholdership. In order to fulfil these duties, and guard against some of the potential 
abuses of free movement, a modest basic and unconditional income was advocated for 
all Europeans.  
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‘transnational’ citizenship to mean a right to the goods associated with citizenship in 
whatever state an individual happens to move and the potential of a horizontal 
dispersal of sovereign power. . 
2 Zielonka (2017) identifies two models of the transnationalism view: transnational 
networks (discussed above) and chaotic pluralism, a more anarchistic version based 
around the development of new technologies of interconnectedness.  
3 Habermas has recently also argued that the European peoples and individual Union 
citizens are the co-constitutive subjects of the EU (2012: ix). However, his account 
remains supranational rather than demoicratic, denying the legitimacy of domestically 
authorised national executives playing a key role in EU levcl decision-making (2012: 
6, 12) and regarding the constitutive moment as instituting the primacy of EU 
legislation over national law (2012: 11). 
4 See, however, Nicoliadis (2013: 364) who points in this direction.  
5 Joseph Carens (2013: 108) stops short of making the equal residency principle a 
requirement of justice, pointing instead to anything short of this as a potentially 
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